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ABSTRACT
Building upon developments in theoretical and applied machine learning, as well as the efforts of var-
ious scholars including Guimera` and Sales-Pardo (2011), Ruger et al. (2004), and Martin et al. (2004),
we construct a model designed to predict the voting behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Using the extremely randomized tree method first proposed in Geurts et al. (2006), a method similar
to the random forest approach developed in Breiman (2001), as well as novel feature engineering, we
predict more than sixty years of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States (1953-2013). Us-
ing only data available prior to the date of decision, our model correctly identifies 69.7% of the Court’s
overall affirm / reverse decisions and correctly forecasts 70.9% of the votes of individual justices across
7,700 cases and more than 68,000 justice votes. Our performance is consistent with the general level of
prediction offered by prior scholars. However, our model is distinctive as it is the first robust, generalized,
and fully predictive model of Supreme Court voting behavior offered to date. Our model predicts six
decades of behavior of thirty Justices appointed by thirteen Presidents. With a more sound methodolog-
ical foundation, our results represent a major advance for the science of quantitative legal prediction and
portend a range of other potential applications, such as those described in Katz (2013).
Keywords: Supreme Court, Machine Learning, Law & Social Science, Quantitative Legal Prediction
INTRODUCTION
Each October, as the leaves begin to fall, the first Monday marks the beginning of another term of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Like the years past and the years that will follow, each term brings
with it a series of challenging and substantively important cases covering a wide range of legal ques-
tions. In a given year the Court might consider topics as diverse as tax law, freedom of speech, patent
law, the law of searches and seizures, administrative law, due process, the proper scope of the takings
clause, freedom of assembly, equal protection, environmental law, and many other legal questions. In
most instances, the Court’s decisions are meaningful not only for the litigants, but also for broader range
of individuals, entities and social and political institutions.
Predicting its decisions and attendant rationales is one of the great pastimes for observers of the Supreme
Court. Every year, the authors of countless law reviews, journals, magazines, newspapers, television and
radio pundits, blog posts, and tweets try to answer the questions that are on everyone’s minds: How will
the Court rule in a particular case? Will the Justices vote based on the political party of the President
who appointed them? Will the Justices surprise us with an unexpected ruling? In these and other related
fora, individual commentators offer various theories about what the Court will do and why it will choose
to do so.
The sheer number of qualitative explanatory and predictive theories is significant. As a matter of sci-
entific forecasting, however, the quality of many of these theories is unclear. It is hard to measure how a
particular approach predicts earlier cases, and, more importantly, how accurately the model will predict
future cases. Without a robust, general model that has been subjected to proper validation, it is difficult
to determine how any given forecasting method will perform over a period of time. Most non-normative
theories offered in traditional legal scholarship designed to forecast the Court’s behavior have not been
tested in any manner that could demonstrate their forward predictive validity, either out-of-sample or
forward prediction. That is, nearly all models have been designed ex post to review or explain cases
already decided, rather than used ex ante to predict future cases. As noted in Martin et al. (2004), “the
best test of an explanatory theory is its ability to predict future events. To the extent that scholars in both
disciplines [social science and law] seek to explain court behavior, they ought to test their theories not
only against cases already decided, but against future outcomes as well.”
Building on recent developments in theoretical and applied machine learning, as well as the efforts of
various scholars including Guimera` and Sales-Pardo (2011), Ruger et al. (2004), and Martin et al. (2004),
we construct a model designed to predict the voting behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Using the extremely randomized tree method first proposed in Geurts et al. (2006), a method similar to a
random forest approach developed in Breiman (2001), as well as novel feature engineering, we apply our
method to predict more than sixty years of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States (1953-
2013). Using only data available prior to the date of decision, our model correctly identifies 69.7% of the
Court’s overall affirm / reverse decisions and correctly forecasts 70.9% of the votes of individual justices
across 7,700 cases and more than 68,000 justice votes. Our performance is consistent with the general
level of prediction offered by prior scholars. However, our model is distinctive as it is the first robust,
generalized, and fully predictive model of Supreme Court voting behavior offered to date. Our model
predicts six decades of behavior of thirty Justices appointed by thirteen Presidents. With a more sound
methodological foundation, our results represent a major advance for the science of quantitative legal
prediction and portend a range of other potential applications, such as those described in Katz (2013).
PREDICTING THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
Every year thousands of petitioners appeal to have their case considered by the United States Supreme
Court. In most situations, the Court will decide to hear a case by a granting a petition for a writ of
certiorari. If that petition is granted, each of the parties to the litigation will then submit written materials
on the relevant issues and later provide oral argument before the Court. Based upon the weight of the
arguments before the Court and other factors, each participating justice (typically nine) ultimately cast
his or her vote whether to affirm or reverse the decision of the lower court. From a prediction standpoint,
there are two related but distinct prediction questions: (1) Will the Court affirm or reverse the lower
Court’s judgment? (2) How will each individual Justice vote on the question before him or her? As
these are typically questions considered in both academic and popular circles, these are the questions we
seek to predict using the methodological approach we outline herein.
Properties of General Supreme Court Prediction Model
There are at least three basic goals that should animate the construction of any Supreme Court prediction
model or method. As a general matter, a model should strive to be general, to be robust and to be
fully predictive. We are mindful of each of these goals when developing our method of Supreme Court
decision-making.
i. General
Starting with the first of these goals, we aim to develop a method of Supreme Court prediction that is
general. Specifically, a method should not only work for a single year or short period but also should be
generalized such that it might work for any year. This is important because it is unclear when making
predictions ex ante whether performance in a given year is systematic or the byproduct of unique features
of a given docket or some other latent features. In other words, it is impossible to know in advance if a
given year will be similar to previous years, or significantly different. At a theoretical level, the effort to
produce a general model can involve a tradeoff between local and global optimization whereby we must
sacrifice some local performance at a specific time period for overall performance over a wide window
of time. It is far easier to make accurate predictions for a given year and a known group of Justices,
rather than to develop a model that works consistently over six decades.
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As the first major effort in this direction, more than ten years ago, political scientists and legal schol-
ars (Ruger et al. (2004)) held a tournament that pitted expert predictors against a prediction algorithm
based upon a classification tree. The goal was straightforward – predict the votes of the individual jus-
tices as well as the ultimate decisions of the Supreme Court prior to the release of the Court’s decision.
For each case, a classification tree generated its predictions while the experts (law professors and prac-
titioners) simultaneously submitted their selections. With respect to predicting outcomes (i.e. affirm /
reverse) for the 78 cases in the 2002-2003 term (the ”October 2002 Term,” as it is called), the prediction
model correctly forecasted 75% of the cases while the human experts correctly identified 59%. For the
votes of individual justices, the model was correct for 66.7% of the justice votes while the human experts
properly identified 67.9%.
Ruger et al. (2004) represented a major contribution to the science of legal forecasting. Their approach
not only performed well in absolute terms but also matched or outperformed subject matter experts.
However, like all efforts it had important limitations. Namely, their model was not general and it is now
relatively clear that the methodological approach they employed is not well specified toward a general
model of Supreme Court prediction. Namely, their approach was conducted during a “natural court,”
which existed during one of the longest extended periods where there were no personnel changes on the
Court, following Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s appointment in 1994. It is unclear how their model would
perform in periods prior to 1994 or after 2005, following the replacements of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David H. Souter, and John Paul Stevens. A general model
would continue to offer accurate predictions, even with the appointment of different justices and across
a wide range of social, economic and political contexts.
ii. Robust
While there is a reasonable level of temporal stability in the decisions of the Court, one cannot know in
advance whether the upcoming Court will behave in a manner similar to its predecessors. As such, the
potential for overfitting remains ever present. Over wider windows of time, various factors such as jus-
tice retirements, justice and court level ideological shifts, doctrinal shifts, a changing docket composition
as well as a changing macro-level social, economic and political environment likely all impact the task
of judicial prediction. The ultimate performance of a prediction is a function of the system variability
and the overall diversity of the case space. Therefore, it is important to select a method that is known to
be robust. That is, it tends to neither overfit nor underfit the respective data.
While the results of the Ruger et al. (2004) tournament were very promising, in the decade that followed
this initial tournament, there was little subsequent Supreme Court prediction scholarship. Other than a
few notable exceptions such as Blackman et al. (2012) and Guimera` and Sales-Pardo (2011), there were
few extensions or improvements of this initial approach. In reviewing Ruger et al. (2004), it appears that
the classification method undertaken was not well suited to the task of robust generalization. Specifically,
in an effort to support model transparency for a non-technical audience (i.e. lawyers and law professors)
the authors used a standard single classification tree in order to generate their predictions. Specifically,
they note “[O]ur choice to use classification trees is motivated by the transparency of the model; i.e.,
trees are produced that can be graphically represented and easily studied.”
One well-known problem with the standard classification tree approach applied in Ruger et al. (2004)
is its tendency toward overfitting. As noted by Hastie et al. (2009), a single classification tree is notori-
ously noisy. Individual classification trees typically feature high levels of variance. As such, the variance
of the final estimator is typically very high. Thus, results are sensitive to small changes in the data and
can even significantly vary across various model runs. Several developments in the theoretical machine
learning literature partially alleviate this issue. Specifically, in the years following Breiman et al. (1984),
significant work on classification and regression trees (CART) has improved their general performance
and helped avoid the problem of overfitting. Breiman (2001) refines Breiman et al. (1984) and offers a
substantial modification of his prior work on bagging “by building a large collection of de-correlated
trees, and then averaging them.” Rather than relying on a single decision tree for a small period of time,
the random forest approach and other related ensemble methods are designed to rely on many random-
ized decision trees in order to reduce the variance of the respective predictive estimator. Given their
relative simplicity, random forests and other related methods such as extremely randomized trees, have
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proven to be highly effective on real world data.
iii. Fully Predictive
In addition to being general and robust, any complete model of Supreme Court prediction should also
be fully predictive. In an important recent paper on Supreme Court prediction, Guimera` and Sales-Pardo
(2011) engage a very particular form of prediction of the Court’s behavior from 1953-2005. They note
”[W]e want to predict the vote of a justice in case n (without loss of generality we set this justice to be
number 1), given the complete voting record of the court up to case n - 1 and the votes of the other eight
justices in case n.” In other words, the authors are predicting the ninth row/column of a matrix given the
values of the other eight rows/columns. Or stated differently, given the votes of all Justices in all pre-
vious cases, and the votes of the eight other Justices in the current case, their model forecasts the vote
of the ninth Justice in the current case. While this approach provides some important insights about the
nature of inter-justice voting patterns, it is not a fully predictive model like that undertaken in Ruger et al.
(2004). It does not allow the prediction of how all nine Justices, currently on the Court, will vote.
At best, it can be characterized as a partially predictive model of Supreme Court behavior. The goal
of Supreme Court prediction faced by scholars and litigators is to forecast an individual justice as well as
the overall Court’s decision without any prior knowledge of the votes of his or her fellow justices. Thus,
a complete model should rely upon a similar information set and undertake the same substantive task
that is typically faced by human subject matter experts.
iv. Toward a General, Robust and Fully Predictive Method
In sum, none of the existing approaches applied to question of Supreme Court prediction simultaneously
achieve the three basic goals of being general, robust and fully predictive. Ruger et al. (2004) is fully
predictive but unfortunately, their approach is not general and their method is not robust. By contrast,
Guimera` and Sales-Pardo (2011) is general and robust, however, it is not fully predictive. As described
below, our approach is the first offering in the literature that satistifes all three of these important criteria
and thus represents a significant advance in the science of quantitative legal prediction.
TREES, FORESTS AND EXTREMELY RANDOM TREES: ADVANCES IN THE
SCIENCE OF BINARY PREDICTION
The applied case of Supreme Court prediction presents a problem of binary classification where we seek
to forecast whether an individual justice, as well as the Supreme Court as a whole, will decide to either
affirm or reverse the judgment of a lower court. In this instance of binary classification, we take the ma-
trix of observable prior data to learn / construct a prediction function. Using that function, we evaluate a
future case and try to predict its corresponding outcome (i.e. affirm or reverse). In our taxonomy, y=0 if
the Court, or a Justice, will affirm the lower court’s decision. y=1 if the Court, or a Justice, will reverse
the lower court’s decision. We use the individual justice vote predictions to forecast the overall decision
of the Supreme Court.
A wide variety of supervised machine learning methods have been developed to learn or recover the
best performing function f(x). One popular approach commonly used for binary classification problems
is the classification and regression trees (CART) methods first offered in Breiman et al. (1984). The
standard CART approach was the method relied on by Ruger et al. (2004). Using a single decision
tree, the authors forecast the respective votes of Supreme Court justices for the October 2002 Term. As
noted earlier, the performance of the tree outperformed human experts, including notable law professors
and well-regarded appellate lawyers. Of important note, in the only tournament ever conducted using
highly renowned lawyers, the experts properly classified 59% of the Court’s overall affirm / reverse rate
correctly, while properly forecasting 67.9% of the votes of individual Justices. In terms of case level pre-
diction, the accuracy rate for the experts was only slightly better than chance (Blackman et al. (2012)).
The classification tree, by contrast, correctly forecasted 75% of the case level outcomes and 66.7% of
the Justice level votes. The performance of this group of experts is illustrative of the difficulty of the pre-
diction problem. While a small number of the Court’s decisions are relatively straightforward, the full
docket–on average about 80 cases per year–contains a number of complex questions that are challenging
to forecast even for well-respected Supreme Court experts.
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The individual trees generated using the CART approach are high variance objects. As a function of
the random perturbations of the model an individual tree may underfit or overfit the data. Building upon
the work of Ho (1998), Breiman (2001) proposed an ensemble method that leverages two forms of ran-
domness - the Breiman (1996) idea of bagging (bootstrap aggregation) with random substrates. One
simple manner in which to understand random forests, extremely randomized trees and other related
ensemble methods is to consider the ideas underlying the wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki (2005),
Page (2008), Fisher (2009), Rauhut and Lorenz (2011)). Ensemble methods leverage the wisdom of the
statistical crowds by generating a number of diverse trees and then averaging across the entire forest.
While an individual statistical learner (a single tree) might offer an unrepresentative prediction of a given
phenomena, under certain conditions, the crowdsourced average of a larger group of learners is often
better able to forecast various sets of outcomes. By generating many different decision trees and then
averaging over the results, ensemble methods can convert a set of otherwise weaker learners into a col-
lectively strong learner.
As highlighted in important investigations such as Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil (2006), Dı´az-Uriarte and De Andres
(2006) and Caruana et al. (2008) ensemble methods have proven to be highly effective for a large num-
ber of classification tasks. In addition, through Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil (2006) and Caruana et al.
(2008) random forests and related methods have been shown to be more robust than both the standard
(CART) approach and a wide variety of other competing methods.
Ensemble methods have been applied by various scholars in a wide variety of contexts (e.g. Irrthum et al.
(2010), Moosmann et al. (2008), Dı´az-Uriarte and De Andres (2006), Shi et al. (2004), Svetnik et al. (2003)).
In the years following Breiman (2001), several alternative but allied methods have been developed. Build-
ing upon the highly influential work on random forests offered in Breiman (2001), Geurts et al. (2006)
offers an alternative ensemble which embeds even more randomness into the tree construction process.
Namely, “[W]ith extremely randomized trees, randomness goes one step further in the way splits are
computed. As in random forests, a random subset of candidate features is used, but instead of looking
for the most discriminative thresholds, thresholds are drawn at random for each candidate feature and the
best of these randomly-generated thresholds is picked as the splitting rule. This usually allows to reduce
the variance of the model a bit more, at the expense of a slightly greater increase in bias.”1 In order to
remain robust against the temporal changes present in the Court’s behavior over the past sixty years, we
generate a set of extremely randomized trees (extra-trees) in the analysis that follows.
DATA AND VARIABLES
In order to build our prediction model, we rely on data from the Supreme Court Database (SCDB). The
SCDB features more than six decades of high-quality expertly coded data on the Court’s behavior.2 A
product of years of dedication by Professor Harold Spaeth as well as others, the database has been con-
sistently subjected to reliability analyses and has been used in hundreds, if not thousands of academic
studies (e.g. Segal and Spaeth (2002), Bailey and Maltzman (2008), Benjamin and Desmarais (2012),
Epstein et al. (2007a), Segal and Spaeth (1996)). While there are important limits (i.e. Shapiro (2008)),
the SCDB features up to two hundred and forty seven variables for each case including background vari-
ables, chronological variables, substantive variables, outcome variables, voting variables and opinion
variables.
We define the outcome of our prediction variable based on the decision of the lower court. We con-
sider whether in a given case n the Supreme Court of the United States will either affirm or reverse the
decision of the lower court. Thus, our left hand side variable is the binary outcome variable 0= affirm,
1= reverse. As noted earlier, for cases with multiple issues (the Court affirms in part, reverses in part) we
consider the primary issue as set forth in SCDB. In addition, we exclude decisions that do not contain
1See “1.9.1.2. Extremely Randomized Trees” available at http://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/ensemble.html
2Harold J. Spaeth, Sara Benesh, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Theodore J. Ruger. 2013. Supreme
Court Database, Version 2013 Release 01. URL: http://supremecourtdatabase.org. Last accessed: July 5, 2014.
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actual justice votes (such as per curiam decisions).
In order to predict our dependent variable, we leverage a wide number of features that have been previ-
ously shown to be meaningful in the existing explanatory theories of Supreme Court decision-making.
The full list of these variables is offered in Figure 1. In the feature selection process, we employ a mix-
ture of variables including those drawn directly from the Supreme Court Database denoted as [S], the
Segal-Cover Scores [SC] and those we developed through various feature engineering [FE]. Each time
the model is retrained, we allow the learner to explore the space and identify the optimal configuration
that best predicts the Court’s behavior based on the large number of features presented in Figure 1.
i. Court and Justice Level Information
As displayed in Figure 1, we include several forms of variables in our model. These include court level
and justice-level variables such as party of appointing president, segal-cover nomination score, year of
birth and natural court (the Court era in which the decision was authored). Along with other variables,
the first two features capture some of the ideological dimensions that explain at least some of the Court’s
decisions. The year of birth and natural court are control variables that we believe might capture an
underlying time dynamic or age dynamic in the vote space.
ii. Case Information
In addition, we include various case-centric features that we have some theoretical basis for believing
might impact the propensity of various judges to vote in a certain manner. As coded by Spaeth, these
include the issue, issueArea, lawType, certReason, respondent, petitioner, caseOrigin, caseSource and
lcDispositionDirection. In addition, we conduct some basic feature engineering that allows us to consider
the monthArgument and monthDecision (which tracks the current month of the model). At first glance,
this last variable would appear to be using out of sample information, as this information is only known
after the case is decided. However, our reported predictions are derived from predictions generated
each day until the day of decision. Thus, including this variable still places us on equal footing with
any human predictor who might attempt to forecast the Court’s decision, and later decide to shift the
forecast at some point prior to the Court’s decision. Given the granularity of the respondent and petitioner
variables (i.e., more than 300 discrete values), we aggregate the relevant categories into higher order bins
under the general belief that it might better aid prediction. These are labeled as respondentbinned and
petitionerbinned, respectfully.
iii. Historical Justice & Court Information
Historical information forms the basis for all predictions. In order to aid our prediction model, we engage
in some basic feature engineering regarding baseline trends in the Court’s behavior. As new Justices have
joined, the court’s average ideology has shifted over the years (Martin and Quinn (2002), Bailey (2013)).
Thus, variables such as courtdirectionmean and courtdirectionstd are designed to track the average and
standard deviation in the Court’s historical behavior on an ideological scale of (0,1) where 0=max liberal
and 1=max conservative.
An additional source of temporal variation in the Court’s behavior is the ideological shift of various indi-
vidual justices (Epstein et al. (2007a), Martin and Quinn (2007), Epstein et al. (2007b)). Thus, through
the justicedirectionmean, and justicedirectionstd features we account for any time varying shift in the
average ideology of individual justices. The justicecourtdifference-z variable tracks differences as mea-
sured in z-scores between an individual justice and the overall court.
Our method is designed to identify and leverage features that contribute to prediction. Thus, we are
somewhat over-inclusive with respect to adding model features.3 As displayed in Figure 1, we include
more than ninety total variables in our model. Taken together, we believe that all of these variables might
meaningfully contribute to predicting individual justices as well as the overall Court’s behavior in the
cases they collectively consider.
3Our complete dataset and associated code is all publicly available on Github: https://github.com/mjbommar/scotus-predict
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Overall Historic Supreme Court Trends  
Mean Court Direction [FE] 
Mean Court Direction 10 [FE] 
Mean Court Direction Issue [FE] 
Mean Court Direction Issue 10 [FE] 
Mean Court Direction Petitioner [FE]
Mean Court Direction Petitioner 10 [FE]
Mean Court Direction Respondent [FE]
Mean Court Direction Respondent 10 [FE]
Mean Court Direction Circuit Origin [FE] 
Mean Court Direction Circuit Origin 10 [FE] 
Mean Court Direction Circuit Source [FE] 
Mean Court Direction Circuit Source 10 [FE] 
Differences in Trends 
Difference Justice Court Direction [FE] 
Abs. Difference Justice Court Direction [FE] 
Difference Justice Court Direction Issue [FE] 
Abs. Difference Justice Court Direction Issue [FE] 
Z Score Difference Justice Court Direction Issue [FE] 
Difference Justice Court Direction Petitioner [FE] 
Abs. Difference Justice Court Direction Petitioner [FE] 
Difference Justice Court Direction Respondent [FE] 
Abs. Difference Justice Court Direction Respondent [FE] 
Z Score Justice Court Direction Difference [FE]
Justice Lower Court Direction Difference [FE]
Justice Lower Court Direction Abs. Difference [FE]  
Justice Lower Court Direction Z Score [FE]
Z Score Justice Lower Court Direction Difference [FE]
Agreement of  Justice with Majority [FE]
Agreement of  Justice with Majority 10 [FE]
Difference Court and Lower Ct Direction [FE] 
Abs. Difference Court and Lower Ct Direction [FE] 
Z-Score Difference Court and Lower Ct Direction [FE] 
Z-Score Abs. Difference Court and Lower Ct Direction [FE] 
Justice and Court Background Information 
Justice [S]
Justice Gender [FE] 
Is Chief  [FE] 
Party President [FE] 
Natural Court [S]
Segal Cover Score [SC]
Year of  Birth [FE] 
Lower Court Trends  
Mean Lower Court Direction Circuit Source [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Circuit Source 10 [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Issue [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Issue 10 [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Petitioner [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Petitioner 10 [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Respondent [FE]
Mean Lower Court Direction Respondent 10 [FE]
Individual Supreme Court Justice Trends  
Mean Justice Direction [FE] 
Mean Justice Direction 10  [FE]
Mean Justice Direction Z Score [FE] 
Mean Justice Direction Petitioner [FE]
Mean Justice Direction Petitioner 10 [FE]
Mean Justice Direction Respondent [FE]
Mean Justice Direction Respondent 10 [FE]
Mean Justice Direction for Circuit Origin [FE]
Mean Justice Direction for Circuit Origin 10 [FE]
Mean Justice Direction for Circuit Source [FE]
Mean Justice Direction for Circuit Source 10 [FE]
Mean Justice Direction by Issue [FE]
Mean Justice Direction by Issue 10 [FE]
Mean Justice Direction  by Issue Z Score  [FE]
Case Information 
Admin Action  [S]
Case Origin   [S] 
Case Origin Circuit [S] 
Case Source  [S]
Case Source Circuit [S]
Law Type [S]
Lower Court Disposition Direction [S]
Lower Court Disposition [S]
Lower Court Disagreement [S]
Issue [S] 
Issue Area [S] 
Jurisdiction Manner [S] 
Month Argument  [FE]
Month Decision [FE]
Petitioner [S] 
Petitioner Binned [FE]
Respondent [S] 
Respondent Binned [FE] 
Cert Reason [S] 
Current Supreme Court Trends  
Mean Agreement Level of  Current Court  [FE]
Std. Dev. of  Agreement Level of  Current Court  [FE]
Mean Current Court Direction Circuit Origin [FE] 
Std. Dev. Current Court Direction Circuit Origin [FE]
Mean Current Court Direction Circuit Source [FE] 
Std. Dev. Current Court Direction Circuit Source [FE]
Mean Current Court Direction Issue [FE]  
Z-Score Current Court Direction Issue [FE]  
Std. Dev. Current Court Direction Issue [FE]  
Mean Current Court Direction [FE] 
Std. Dev. Current Court Direction [FE] 
Mean Current Court Direction Petitioner [FE] 
Std. Dev. Current Court Direction Petitioner [FE] 
Mean Current Court Direction Respondent [FE] 
Std. Dev. Current Court Direction Respondent [FE] 
Figure 1. Variables Employed by the Model
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METHODS
Formalizing a Set of Extremely Randomized SCOTUS Trees
The search for the optimal tree configuration is an NP-complete problem (Hyafil and Rivest (1976)).
Thus, the optimal solution to such tree configuration problems cannot be determined in advance. For
anything other than a trivial problem, this implies that we must rely upon some sort of heuristic solution
in the tree construction process. Luckily, there exist a number of well performing heuristics designed to
solve for the optimal tree configuration using various approximate solution methods (e.g. Murthy (1998),
Chou (1991), Safavian and Landgrebe (1991)).
In recent years, there have been major advances in classification tree methods. In empirical investi-
gations such as Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil (2006) and Caruana et al. (2008), ensemble methods have
been shown to be unreasonably effective on real world data. Ensemble methods such as random forests,
extremely randomized trees and fully random trees leverage several forms of randomness – (1) random-
ness in the data and (2) randomness in the features (potential splits). For example, the Breiman (2001)
random forest method applies bootstrapping aggregation to the row of our training data while also sam-
pling random substrates of the variables listed in the columns. A final ensemble create using such an
approach is thus theoretically grounded and typically produces a robust method prediction with much
lower variance than that produced using the CART approach.
A close analog of random forests are extremely randomized trees (ERT). We apply ERTs (Geurts et al.
(2006)) in our analysis. Despite its similarity to random forests, there are important differences. First,
extremely randomized trees do not rely on the bagging procedure as outlined in Breiman (1996). Instead,
the same input training set is used to train all of the trees in question (Geurts et al. (2006)). In addition,
ERT selects the split by indexing randomly across both the variable index and variable splitting value.
By contrast, the random forest select the optimal splitting condition among a random subset of vari-
ables. As noted in (Geurts et al. (2006)), “[F]rom the bias-variance point of view, the rationale behind
the Extra-Trees (extremely randomized trees) method is that the explicit randomization of the cut-point
and attribute combined with ensemble averaging should be able to reduce variance more strongly than
the weaker randomization schemes used by other methods. The usage of the full original learning sample
rather than bootstrap replicas is motivated in order to minimize bias.”
The full pseudo-code of the extremely randomized trees (extra-trees) algorithm as outlined in Geurts et al.
(2006) is offered below:
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Pseudo-Code of the Extra Trees Algorithm - Geurts, et al. (2006)
Build an extra tree ensemble(S).
Input: a training set S.
Output: a tree ensemble T = {t1,..., tM}.
–For i=1 to M
• Generate a tree: ti=Build an extra tree(S);
–Return T .
Build an extra tree(S).
Input: a training set S.
Output: a tree t
–Return a leaf labeled by class frequencies in S if
(i) |S| < nmin, or
(ii) all candidate attributes are constant in S, or
(iii) the output variable in constant in S
–Otherwise:
1. Select randomly K attributes, {a1, ...,aK}, without replacement, among all (non constant in S)
candidate attributes;
2. Generate K splits {s1, ...,sK}, where si = Pick a random split(S, ai), ∀i = 1, ..., K;
3. Select a split s∗ such that Score(s∗, S) = maxi=1,...K Score(s∗, S)
4. Split S into subsets Sl and Sr according to the test s∗;
5. Build tl = Build an extra tree(Sl) and tr = Build an extra tree(Sr) from these subsets;
6. Create a node with the split s∗, attach tl and tr as left and right subtrees of this node and return the
resulting tree t.
Pick a random split(S,a)
Input: a training set S and an attribute a.
Output: a split.
–If the attribute a is numerical:
• Compute the maximal and minimal value of a in S, denoted respectively by aSmin and aSmax;
• Draw a cut-point ac uniformly in [aSmin, aSmax];
• Return the split [a < ac].
–If the attribute a is categorical (denote by A its set of possible values):
• Compute AS the subset of A of values of a that appear in S;
• Randomly draw a proper non empty subset A1 of AS and a subset A2 of A \AS;
• Return the split [a ∈ A1 ∪ A2].
Using the extra-trees algorithm, we store a time-ordered subset of the Supreme Court Database
(SCDB) and other derived features in a feature matrix for all cases prior to the current case. This in-
cludes data for each case and each justice indexed up to the n - 1 case. From this feature matrix, we
derive the individual trees and overall ensemble following the protocol outlined in the pseudocode. We
apply the default settings of the ExtraTreesClassifier (Extremely Randomized Trees) with limited ex-
ceptions.4 Given the data available up to the n - 1 case (the last case decided before the case we are
attempting to predict), we apply the latest instance of our extremely randomized tree ensemble. In other
words, using the derived ERT, we pass the justice, case and overall court level features for the current
case to the current set of extremely randomized trees and output a prediction each Justice. Then using
this set of justice level forecasts, we can then construct a case level prediction using majority rule.
In order to validate our model, we apply stratified k-fold cross-validation with 10 folds per training.
4See Pedregosa et al. (2011), in particular, 3.2.3.3.3. sklearn.ensemble.ExtraTreesClassifier
http://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.ensemble.ExtraTreesClassifier.html. The parameters used to train the clas-
sifier are as follows: ’classify min samples leaf’: 2, ’classify max depth’: 32,’classify max features’: 24, ’classify n estimators’:
4000.
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At each training step, we divide our training data into ten samples. We then train 9 models on each of
the nine subsets of nine folds, testing these models on the remaining “holdout” sample. We select the
model that performs best on the holdout sample as determined by its F1 score. Using the resulting final
model at each training step, we can predict how each individual justice, and therefore the entire Court,
will vote for a specific case.5 This determination is based on all previous decisions for that Justice, the
Court, and all previous cases. This mimics the type of methodology that a Supreme Court expert would
rely on when making their own ex ante predictions.
RESULTS
The Supreme Court Database offers coverage from 1946-2013 (the end of the most recent Supreme
Court term). We train our model on the period from 1946 -1953, under the leadership of Chief Jusice
Fred Vinson (known as the Vinson Court). We begin making forward prediction starting with the first
case of the Warren Court in 1953, through the end of the 2012-2013 term. For each of the predictions,
offered over 60 years–7,700 cases and in excess of 68,000 individual justice votes–we only rely on data
that would have been available prior to the Court’s decision. We depart from Guimera` and Sales-Pardo
(2011) by not leveraging information about the votes of other Justices in the current case in order predict
any other justice’s votes. In other words, we construct a fully predictive model, which relies entirely on
information available prior to the decision of the Court. No future information is relied on.
We restrict our analysis to cases with an actual written decision and assigned justice votes. Thus, our
analysis does not include per curiam decisions or decisions that were dismissed on procedural grounds.
Following the convention used by Harold Spaeth and his successors, we seek to predict the cases’ pri-
mary issue dimension as defined in the respective database. This follows the basic logic of issue-based
voting outlined in the formal modeling literature by Anderson IV and Tahk (2007). Although we could
in principle disaggregate any cases respective of its issue dimensions and feed them into the model, for
purposes of consistency with prior scholars, we restrict our analysis to standard cases.
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Figure 2. Annual Accuracy of SCOTUS Extreme Randomized Trees
There are two forms of prediction that we undertake in this study – (1) justice level vote prediction,
and (2) the prediction of the overall case outcome. Applying the extremely randomized trees approach
to each case from 1953-2013, our model correctly forecasts 69.7% of Case Outcomes and 70.9% of Jus-
tice Level Vote Outcomes over the sixty year period. While the results are close, somewhat surprisingly
our model performs slightly better for the justice votes than on the cases themselves. We believe that this
5Additional details regarding our model implementation is publicly available on Github -
https://github.com/mjbommar/scotus-predict
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partly due to our success at forecasting the behavior of those distant from the Court’s ideological center.
Seen from a year over year perspective, there is a reasonable amount of variability in the model per-
formance. This is likely a function of changing predictability of the Supreme Court case space. It is also
likely a function of the inherent complexity of the forecasting problem. The intermittent variability of
our performance, however, does not provide the whole story. To provide a more complete perspective,
Figure 2 plots both the yearly performance (blue) our model together with local polynomial regression
(loess) (Cleveland and Devlin (1988)). This loess regression fit provides a perspective on the perfor-
mance of our model over time. While the performance of our model varies from year to year, the trend
remains relatively consistent over the sixty year period.
Importantly, our method performs against a backdrop of justice transitions, shifting size and compo-
sition of the docket, as well as different macro political and economic conditions. Our results compare
favorably to those presented in prior work (Guimera` and Sales-Pardo (2011), Ruger et al. (2004)) but are
based upon the first generalized, robust and fully predictive model offered to date.
Exploring the Confusion Matrices and the Asymmetry in Affirm / Reversal Rates
The case level confusion matrix displayed in Table 1 highlights the case level performance of the overall
model from 1953-2013. The primary diagonal represents the true positive (we predicted an affirm, and
the Court affirmed) and true negative (we predicted a reverse, and the Court reversed) elements. The
off-diagonal elements are the false positive (we predicted an affirm, and the Court reversed) and false
negatives (we predicted a reverse, and the Court affirmed). A review of the matrix reveals an important
property of the Court’s decision making. Namely, the Court reverses a majority of the cases it accepts
for review. As displayed in Figure 3 below, over the past sixty years, it is quite common for the Court
to reverse in excess of 60% of the cases it considers in any given year. Our model properly identifies a
significant percentage of these reversal decisions correctly.
Predict Affirm Predict Reverse Total
Court Affirms 767 1,856 2,623
Court Reverses 474 4,603 5,077
Total 1,242 6,458 7,700
Table 1. Case Level Confusion Matrix
By contrast, false positives, where we predict an affirm and the Court reverses, drive a significant per-
centage of the error in our model. The performance of our Supreme Court extremely randomized trees
approach suffers most on the difficult task of determining when the Court will affirm the decision of the
lower court (false positives). On average, when the Court grants certiorari, it does so to reverse a lower
court decision, not to affirm it.
In 1,856 of the cases, the model incorrectly predicts that the court will reverse when it actually af-
firmed the lower court’s decision. These false positives are likely generated in part from the underlying
asymmetry in the Court’s affirm / reversal rates as displayed in Table 1 and Figure 2. Our model also
likely struggles with the time varying nature of this asymmetry. Namely, the reversal percentage shifts
from year to year and is, of course, not guaranteed to remain consistent going forward. Consider Figure
3, which displays the annual percentage of case reversed from 1953-2013. The percentage fluctuates
widely from as high as 77.5% to as little as 50%. In the most recent years, since the start of Chief Justice
Roberts’s tenure, the percentages of cases that are reversed have dipped but thus far remain well within
historic averages.
The justice vote confusion matrix displays a similar pattern to the case confusion matrix. In terms
of overall error, we generate roughly four and a half times as much total error from instances where we
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Figure 3. Annual Case Overturn Percentage
predict a reversal and the court affirms the lower court (false negative) than instances where we predict
affirm and the court reverses (false positive). In other words, false positives far outstrip false negatives.
In terms of precision and recall, however, the results are far more balanced.
Predict Affirm Predict Reverse Total
Justice Affirms 11,751 13,816 22,567
Justice Reverses 6,233 37,164 43,397
Total 17,984 50,980 68,964
Table 2. Justice Vote Confusion Matrix
THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF PARTICULAR FEATURES TO THE OVER-
ALL PREDICTION
What features actually contribute to forecasting the behavior of the Supreme Court? What is the rela-
tive contribution of these factors to overall prediction? There exists a long-standing debate about the
subset of the feature space that actually assists in predicting judicial decision making. Traditional legal
scholars tend to emphasize the legal features and legal questions presented in individual cases. They
tend to downplay weighted non-legal factors such as judicial ideology and its contribution to the shape
of the law, and focus on jurisprudence and formal legal doctrine. Legal realists and social scientists who
study judicial behavior have demonstrated the incompleteness of this traditional description of the Court
decision-making. While there is likely merit in elements of many existing theories, the challenging ques-
tion is how to properly characterize the ensemble of legal, political and social factors which collectively
drive observed outcomes.
Figure 4 presents the final feature weights as of June 2013. While these feature weights have adapted
over time to take stock of changes in Court’s behavior, the June 2013 feature weights provide useful
insight into how our model operates. It is important to note that many of these features are highly corre-
lated. This ultimately complicates their interpretation (Tolos¸i and Lengauer (2011), Strobl et al. (2008)).
Although we present the marginal predictive contribution of each feature, we are mindful of the inherent
issues associated with their estimate / interpretation. That said, the seven larger categories we present in
Figure 4 provide a more reliable (albeit less granular) perspective regarding the contribution of various
classes of features. Collectively, individual case features account for approximately 23% of predictive
power while Justice and Court level background information account for just 4.4%. Much of the pre-
dictive power of our model is driven by tracking a variety of behavioral trends. This includes tracking
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Figure 4. Final Feature Weights as of June 2013
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the ideological direction of overall voting trends as well as the voting behavior of various justices. Dif-
ferences in these trends prove particular useful for prediction. These include general and issue specific
differences between individual justices and the balance of the Court as well as ideological differences
between the Supreme Court and lower courts.
Notwithstanding a few notable efforts, Guimera` and Sales-Pardo (2011), Blackman et al. (2012), Ruger et al.
(2004), and Martin et al. (2004), to date, almost all legal and social science scholarship has been back-
ward looking whereby scholars seek to interpret, explain or harmonize prior court behavior. Even fewer
efforts have sought to identify the marginal forward predictive contribution of various case, justice, and
other temporal features. We identify features that matter for forward-looking predictions and the relative
extent to which they aid in ex ante prediction. Our approach is also replicable and modular so future
scholars can substitute or amend our feature set to determine its impact upon model performance.
JUSTICE AND COURT LEVEL TEMPORAL PREDICTABILITY
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Figure 5. Heatmap of Justice and Court Level Temporal Predictability
Figure 5 is heatmap that tracks the temporal performance of our model by Justice. Each column repre-
sents a year and each row represents an individual justice. For each {justice, year} pairing corresponding
to a year of service, the cell of the heatmap is colored according to the Justice level performance of our
model. The more green the cell, the more predictable the Justice in that year. In a few instances where
an outgoing and incoming Justice overlapped in a given year the column for that year features with ten
colored cells instead of the standard nine. Although we generally err on the side of visualizing all of the
data, we do not display cells for Justices that participated in a small fraction of cases in that given term.
For example, a Justice who was appointed late in a term, or a Justice who stepped down early in the term.
Reviewing Figure 5, our method performs well at predicting certain Justices and not as well on others.
For example, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Burton prove relatively difficult to predict. By contrast,
our method is fairly accurate at predicting the behavior of Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Thomas. This
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perhaps can be explained by their status as fairly far from the ideological center.
From an overall perspective, one trend that is immediately apparent is the general level of stability in the
quality of our predictions. Following a short learning period, our ability to predict a given Justice tends
to follow a regularized pattern. In other words, whether we are able to predict a specific case accurately
or not, our long run performance is relatively stable for most Justices within a small window of time.
There are, of course, notable exceptions. Justice Stevens begins as a difficult to predict justice but over
time becomes increasingly easier to predict. In his years as an Associate Justice our performance in pre-
dicting William Rehnquist is relatively strong. This changes almost immediately following his elevation
to Chief Justice in 1986 when our performance begins to decline.
ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE BY VOTE CONFIGURATION
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Figure 6. Algorithm Performance by Vote Configuration
In addition to exploring the overall and justice level performance of our model, we also seek to ex-
plore how the ultimate decision (affirm / reverse) and vote breakdown (9-0 through 5-4) might impact a
case’s predictability. Our naı¨ve assumption was that our model would perform best on cases where the
Court was in agreement and would perform worst in cases with high levels of disagreement among mem-
bers of the Court. Figure 6 supports this basic proposition. It also once again highlights the strengths
and weakness in our model, which performs better for reverse judgments than for affirm judgments.
With respect to cases that ultimately lead to reversals, our model tracks the commonplace intuition that
9-0 reversals are easier to forecast than 5-4 reversals. While our performance between these categories
is somewhat close in certain years, we consistently perform better in unanimous reversal cases than in
cases which feature disagreement between justices. We also perform better on cases with a vote of 9-0
to affirm than in cases that affirm through a divided court. However, as demonstrated earlier, it is clear
that our model struggles to identify in advance cases that the Court ultimately decides to affirm. Since
1953, the Court has affirmed 2,623 cases or 34.1% of its fully argued cases. On this subset of cases, our
model does not perform particularly well. In some years, we are able to forecast less than 25% of these
cases correctly.
An open question for future research is whether this failure to accurately predict affirmed decisions
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is a permanent fixture of underlying stochasticity in Court’s behavior or a failure of the model or avail-
able feature set to identify some latent dimension that would allow for better forecasting of the reversal /
affirm decision.
CONCLUSION
Using only information known prior to the Court’s decision, case by case and term by term, we construct
a model that predicts each decision of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1953 - 2013. Lever-
aging extremely randomized trees, a particular form of ensemble tree model, we correctly forecast 69.7%
of the Court’s overall affirm / reverse decisions and 70.9% of the votes of individual justices across the
7,700 cases and more than 68,000 justice votes. We offer a major contribution to the science of quantita-
tive legal prediction by generating the first general, robust and fully predictive model of Supreme Court
decision making offered to date.
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